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California's New General Corporation Law:
Prospects For Minority Shareholders

California has long been recognized as a jurisdiction having laws
which tend to favor the corporate shareholder and creditor, sometimes at
the expense of corporate management. One commentator wrote of the
Old California Corporations Code:' "In a nutshell, what the... Code
seeks to embody is an appreciation of the important role of shareholders
'2
and creditors in any prosperous business community.
In addition to benefiting from statutory provisions which have been
particularly protective of minority shareholders, such investors have
been afforded a degree of protection through decisions of the California
courts, as illustrated by the landmark case of Jones v. Ahmanson,3
which expanded the traditional rules of fiduciary duties owed from
majority to minority shareholders. 4 This case involved majority shareholders who formed a holding company to enhance the marketability of
closely-held, high value stock." The minority shareholders were excluded from the holding company, and as a result, were effectively deprived
of a market for their shares.' Under the traditional approach, the court
would have denied a cause of action to the minority plaintiffs who had
1. CAL. CoR. CODE §§100-35302, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1947, C. 1038 (effective
until January 1, 1977) [hereinafter all citations and references to the General Corporation Law as enacted in 1947 will be cited as or referred to as CAL. COitp. CODB or Old

Code].

2. Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 Lkw & CONTEMp. PRon. 193, 199 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Jennings]. See
also Comment, Choice of CorporateDomicile, 49 CAL. L. R~v. 518, 519 (1961), citing
California as "one of the leading states in the protection of security holder and public
interests."

3. 1 Cal. 3d 93,460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
4. 6 B. WrTErN, SummARY oF CALtooRNA LAw, CorpOrations, §§164-65 (8th ed.
1974) [hereinafter cited as 6 WrrKx, Corporations].
5. 1 Cal. 3d at 102, 460 P.2d at 466, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
6. Id. at 103, 460 P.2d at 467, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
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asserted breach of fiduciary duty as the basis of their lawsuit, because
fiduciary obligations of majority to minority attached only to sale of

control or sale of assets situations. 7 However, the California court
noted that
[tihe increasingly complex transactions of the business and financial communities demonstrate the inadequacy of the traditional
theories of fiduciary obligation as tests of majority shareholder responsibility to the minority. These theories have failed to afford
adequate protection to minority shareholders and particularly to
those in closely held corporations whose disadvantageous and often
precarious position renders them particularly vulnerable to the
vagaries of the majority.8

Although cases subsequent to the Jones decision have continued to
assume this protective posture,' there are reasons to believe the trend
may have been arrested or at least slowed by the adoption of the New

General Corporation Law to be effective January 1, 1977.10 Although
many shareholder protections embodied in the Old Code11 do remain in
the New Code-indeed, there are areas of increased protection for
shareholders-there are many respects in which the California minority

shareholder appears to have lost ground and may be increasingly susceptible to management or majority oppression.
The purpose of this comment is to assess the status of the minority
shareholder

2

in California and to evaluate the prospects for minority

protection under the New Corporations Code. The comment attempts
7. 6 WrrmN, Corporations, supra note 4, §164-65. See also text accompanying
note 112 (sale of assets) and note 231 (sale of control) infra.
8. 1 Cal. 3d at 111, 460 P.2d at 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 592, quoted in 6 Wrr=N,
Corporations,supra note 4, §165. See also In re Security Finance, 49 Cal. 2d 370, 317
P.2d 1 (1957) (a breach of the majority's duty to the minority in a dissolution setting
where the majority induced the dissolution, purchased the assets of the dissolving
corporation, then resumed business without the minority shareholders); Remillard Brick
v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952) (dominant
shareholders breached their duty by transferring corporate business to their own separate
corporation).
9. See, e.g., Rankin v. Frebank Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 75, 121 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1975); DeBaun v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354
(1975).
10. CAl. STATS. 1975, c. 682 (effective January 1, 1977) [hereinafter all citations
and references to the New General Corporation Law, enacted, CAL. STATs. 1975, c. 682,
will be cited as or referred to as New CAL. CORP. CODE or New Code] See generally
Rnvinw oF SELECTED 1975 CALn OFIu IxGISLATION, this volume at 258 (General
Corporation Law).
11. See note 1 supra.
12. The term "minority shareholder" generally connotes an absence of control over
corporate affairs. Theoretically a minority shareholder would be anyone with holdings
of less than 50 percent of the outstanding stock of a corporation. However, there are
many instances where a holder of less than half the stock nonetheless effectively controls
the corporation, or at least has a substantial role in its management. See Andrews, The
Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HtAv. L. Rlv. 505,
506 (1965).
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to catalogue various major concerns for minority shareholders, with
particular emphasis upon methods by which the minority may be
'' or oppressed 4 by a self-serving majority. In some of
"squeezed-out "I
the areas to be examined, the New Code does not change the minority

shareholder's status. Nonetheless, these areas will be discussed in an
effort to present a well-rounded picture of the minority shareholder's
status in California. Although previous works have covered the spectrum of concerns for minority shareholders exhaustively, 5 none have
focused on the California shareholder in particular.

The following areas will be examined with respect to the California
minority shareholder: dividends, corporate employment and salaries,
fundamental corporate changes, issuance of stock and preemptive rights,

voting rights, meeting and quorum requirements, sale of corporate
control, and shareholder suits. Each of these concerns will be evaluated
regarding its potential for harming the minority shareholder, and the
likelihood of such harms occurring will be assessed in light of the New

Corporations Code and California case law. This discussion will be
followed by a summary of the emerging status of the minority shareholder, and by some observations as to how the courts are likely to treat
minority shareholders under the new statutory provisions which will

alter several protective measures in favor of "majoritarianism"' policies.
In assessing the minority shareholder's status, it is important to keep
in mind the delicate balance between corporate management interests
and shareholder protections. In the past, California lawmakers have
sought to make California corporate law
liberal enough to facilitate business transactions without undue
formalities of checks and balances, of votes and consents of shareholders, and applicants to courts, and at the same time not so lax
that the management or the majority may manipulate the ma13. "'Squeeze-out' means the elimination of one or more shareholders of a business
by those who control it, through the use of their powers of control, inside information, or
other technique without fair value being paid in return:" O'Neal and Janke, Utilizing
Rule 10b-5 for Remedying Squeeze-Outs or Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 16
B.C. IND. & CoM. L REV. 327 (1975) [hereinafter cited as O'Neal & Janke].
14. "Oppression" in the corporate context refers to conduct of directors or others in
control which is" 'burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct;' . . . '[lacking] probity and
fair dealing in affairs of a company to the prejudice of some of its members;' or 'a visible
departure from the standards of fair dealings, and a violation of fair play on which every
shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely."' Comment,
Oppression as a Statutory Ground For Corporate Dissolution, 1965 DuKE LJ. 128, 134
(1965) (citations omitted).
15. See, e.g., F. O'NEL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS
AssocunoNs: "SQuEnzE-Otrrs" IN SlA.L ENTERPRISES (1961) [hereinafter cited as
O'NEAL & DERWIN]; Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HAry. L. Rnv. 1630
(1961); Symposium: The Close Corporation,52 Nw. U.L. REv. 384, 391-92 (1957). See
also O'Neal & Janke, supra note 13.
16. See text accompanying notes 75, 160, and 200 infra.

1976 / Minority Shareholders
chinery to the prejudice of creditors or investors or the oppression
17
of minority shareholders.

Management oriented critics imply that this balance has not been
achieved and that protective codes such as California's unduly inhibit

management.1 8 As a result, out-of-state incorporation is a prevalent
phenomenon in California.19 However, with the adoption of the New
Code, it might be argued that the shift toward a stronger management

orientation detectable in the New Code may make California a more
attractive state for future incorporation.
As an added note of introduction, Chapter 21 of the New Corporations Code will more broadly extend California substantive law to quasiforeign corporations.2" Thus, certain corporations which are incorporated outside California will be subjected for the first time to many
provisions of California law. It may well be this expanded out-of-state
impact of the New Code which motivated the move toward a management orientation, as absent such a policy shift, one could speculate that
out-of-state corporations might be discouraged from doing substantial
business in California."
DIVIDENDS
For the minority shareholder, dividends may be the only source of

income realized as a result of his investment, and thus a failure of the
corporation to declare dividends may seriously jeopardize a minority

shareholder's ability to maintain his investment. 2

This is a concern of

17. Jennings, supra note 2, at 199.
18. See, e.g., Comment, Choice of a CorporateDomicile, 49 CAL. L. REv. 518, 524
(1961) (the protective cumulative vote concept is attacked as "tend[ing] to make
management overly conservative and unwilling to take necessary risks"). See generally
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
664 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Cary].
19. See Comment, California's New Corporation General Law: Quasi-Foreign
Corporations,this volume at 673.
20. Under the New Corporations Code Section 2115, quasi-foreign corporations are
subject to the following provisions: New CAL. CoRP. CODE §§301 (annual election of
directors), 303 (removal of directors without cause), 304 (removal of directors by court
proceedings), 305(c) (filling of director vacancies where less than a majority in office
have been elected by shareholders), 309 (directors' standard of care), 316 excluding
subdivisions (a)(3) and (f)(3) (liability of directors for unlawful distributions), 317
(indemnification of directors, officers and others), 500-505 (limitations on corporate
distributions in cash or property), 506 (liability of shareholders who receive unlawful
distributions), 600(b) and (c) (requirement for annual shareholders' meeting and
remedy if same not timely held), 708(a), (b), and (c) (shareholders' right to cumulate
votes any election of directors), 1200-1201 (reorganizations), 1300-1312 (dissenters'
rights), 1500-1501 (records and reports), and 1600-1605 (rights of inspection).
21. For a discussion of what constitutes "substantial business," see Comment,
California'sNew General CorporationLaw: Quasi-ForeignCorporations,this volume at
673.
22. See generally O'NEAL & DERwi , supra note 15, at 45-52. For a general
discussion of the New Code's dividend provision see Comment, California'sNew General
CorporationLaw: Dividends and Reacquisitions of Shares, this volume at 645.
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particular importance to the holder of shares in a very small or a closelyheld corporation where the investment per shareholder may be substantial.23 For the majority shareholder, the impact of withheld dividends
may not be as substantial, particularly in a small corporation in which
majority shareholders often are corporate employees and can withdraw
corporate profits by way of salary payments rather
than dividend pay24
taxation.
double
to
subject
be
would
ments, which
One reason that the board of directors may withhold dividends might
be to silence a dissident voice by forcing a minority shareholder to sell
his shares. If the withholding of dividends is timed to coincide with
known financial hardship of a minority shareholder, the majority shareholders may not only be able to force a minority holder to sell, but also
may be able to obtain the minority shares at a bargain price. 25
Faced with a situation of withheld dividends, the shareholder may be
able to compel declaration of a dividend if he can show it has been
wrongfully withheld. This is, however, a judicial remedy which is
difficult to obtain. In addition to meeting the security-for-expense
requirements, 6 the moving shareholder has the burden of showing
fraud,2 7 bad faith, or clear abuse of discretion2 on the part of directors

failing to declare dividends. This burden may be difficult to overcome,
for the courts are reluctant to interfere with the "business judgment"
aspects of corporate affairs. 29 Thus,

[t]he mere fact that a corporation has surplus profits out of which
a dividend might lawfully be declared is not of itself sufficient
ground for the court ... to compel

.

.. a dividend . . ., unless

there is a clear abuse of discretion, or0 the action taken by the directors is unreasonable and oppressive.3
To establish an action as unreasonable or oppressive a shareholder must
establish the amount of corporate earnings, the amount of capital required for operation and expansion (an area of much discretion for the
23. Elson, Shareholders Agreements, A Shield for Minority Shareholders of Close
Corporations,22 Bus. LAWYER 449, 451 (1967).
24. See text accompanying note 55 infra.
25. O'NEAL & DERwIN, supra note 15, at 45.
26. See text accompanying note 267, infra. There is a split of authority as to
whether the compulsory dividend action is derivative or individual. 11 W. FLETCHEn,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIvATE CORPORATIONS, §5326.1 (perm. ed. rev. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as 11 FLETCHER]. Security for expense statutes generally apply only
to derivative actions. See Comment, Due Process and Security for Expense Statutes,
this volume at 176, 182.
27. 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, §5829
(perm. ed. rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as 13 FLETCHER].
28. 11 FLETCHER, supranote 26, at §5325.
29. Id. See also Comment, California'sNew General CorporationLaw: Directors'
Liability to Corporations,this volume at 613, 622-23, 626-27 (the business judgment
rule).
30. 11 FLETCHER, supra note 26, at §5325 (emphasis added).
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directors 31 ), why there has been no dividend declaration, and a breach
of fiduciary duty. 2
The cases of Zellerbach v. Allenburg33 and Estate of Talbot 4 illustrate the California courts' continued treatment of this issue as one
within the parameters of the business judgment rule. In Zellerbach, a
plaintiff who was indebted to the defendant corporation alleged that
defendant fraudulently failed to declare and credit dividends against the

debt. 5 The court stated:
[Tihe rule as to declaring dividends is that the apportionments of
the net earnings to the payment of cash dividends . . . is largely
one of policy, intrusted to the discretion of directors, which when
36
honestly and intelligently exercised, will not be lightly overruled.

Finding no fraud, the court denied petitioner's claim to compel a
'7
dividend

Estate of Talbot, a case in which the court was faced with the

question of whether a corporate distribution was principal or income for
trust purposes,18 further illustrates the significance the California courts
will afford to business discretion in the dividend setting. Because the

distribution was made pursuant to a federal court decree compelling
partial liquidation, the Talbot court characterized the distribution as
involuntary, and hence principal rather than income2 9 In essence, the

court refused to characterize the distribution as a dividend because it
had not been made by the board in the exercise of its "sound business
'4

judgment.
Chapter Five of the New California Corporations Code will control
the distribution of corporate funds. 4 ' Section 50042 sets out what the
31. O'NEAL & DEnwvN, supranote 15, at 46.
32. Id. at 46, 50. To further illustrate the degree of discretion involved in
assessing the adequacy of corporate funds, the courts consider: the amount of surplus,
the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, working capital requirements, working
capital retained in prior years, business prospects, the corporation's need for expansion,
and present and future liabilities. Id. at 50.
33. 99 Cal. 57, 33 P. 786 (1893).
34. 269 Cal. App. 2d 526, 74 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1969).
35. 99 Cal. at 69, 73, 33 P. at 790-91.
36. 99 Cal. at 70-71, 33 P. at 790, quoting Mining Co. v. Pierce, 90 Cal. 131, 14546, 27 P. 44, 47 (1891) (citations omitted).
37. 99 Cal. at 71, 33 P. at 790.
38. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 529, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
39. Id. at 537, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. For a full discussion of CAL. Cop. CODE §1500 et. seq. which controls the
distribution of dividends under the Old Code, see Comment, California'sNew General
CorporationLaw: Dividends and Reacquisitions of Shares, this volume at 645.
42. New CAL. CORP.CODE, §500 provides, inter alia:
Neither a corporation nor any of its subsidiaries shall make a distribution
to the corporation's shareholders.

. .

unless:

(a) The amount of retained earnings ... equals or exceeds the amount d
the proposed distribution; or
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drafters of the New Code call a "balance sheet" or "solvency" approach,
which is to replace the "stated capital" and "surplus" approaches of the
former law.43 This provision, which the drafters of the New Code
added "[flor the purpose of establishing meaningful protection for
creditors and shareholders . . . ,"" may eliminate one method of
oppressing the minority insofar as it will prevent the declaration of
"whopping" dividends which may deplete corporate assets." Thus, the
shareholder seeking dividends as a return on his investment would,
under the new law, seem to be protected in the sense that any declared
dividend would not jeopardize his basic investment. However, he
would still face the obstacles presented by the business judgment rule in
any action to compel a dividend."
There are, in addition to .the suit to compel dividends, other possible
remedies for the shareholder who is not receiving dividends. Sections
531 through 537 of the Internal Revenue Code4 7 impose penalties upon
the unreasonable accumulation of earnings. The possibility of a tax
penalty may serve to keep the directors in a fair dividend-declaring
posture, or may arm the shareholder with an effective weapon. For
example, the shareholder may be able to compel a dividend by threatening a report to the IRS, and evidence of a previously imposed tax
penalty may bolster a shareholder's case in a suit to compel the dividend.
Another possibility for the deprived shareholder may be an action in
federal courts, relying on Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
To illustrate,
Act of 193448 and its implementing Rule 10b-5.49
(b) . ..(after the distribution]:
(1) The sum of the assets . ..would be at least equal to 1% times
its liabilities.. . ,and
(2) The current assets would be At least equal to its current liabilities
or, if the average earnings . . . before taxes . . . and before interest expense
for the two preceding fiscal years was less than the average of the interest expense . . . for such fiscal years, at least equal to 1,4 times its current liabilities ....
43. CALIF N _A.LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY SELECr COMMiTrEE ON THE REVISION OF
THE CORPORATIONS CODE, REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY

REVISION OF THE CORPORATIONS CODE 72 (1975)
REPORT].

SELECTr COMMrrraE ON THE

[hereinafter cited as ASSEMBLY

44. Id.
45. See O'NEAL & DERwIN, supra note 15, at 135; see also 11 FLETCHER, supra
note 26, at §5325.
46. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
47. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§531-37. See also O'NEAL & DERWiN, supra note
15, at 52.
48. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1934). That Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules as the Commission may prescribe....
See also O'Neal & Janke, supra note 13, at 335.
49. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1951). This regulation, which implements §10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 48, provides:
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where a board of directors fails to declare a dividend in hopes of forcing
a dissident minority to sell his shares, there may well be a "fraud... in
connection with. . the sale of securities" sufficient to invoke the Rule
lOb-5 remedy."'
Finally, a shareholder could seek to prospectively control dividends
through a charter or bylaw provision specifying the conditions under
which dividends will be mandatorily distributed.5 1 In California, however, it is not certain whether dividends can be so controlled in the
absence of a shareholders' agreement under Section 300(b) of the New
Code. Though Section 505 of the New Code states that "[n]othing in
this chapter prohibits additional restrictions upon the declaration of
. ," there is no
dividends. . . by provision in the articles or bylaws.
such specific grant of authority to compel distributions through the
articles or bylaws.
To summarize, under the Old Corporations Code, the California
minority shareholder is in a position similar to shareholders in other
states with respect to dividends. He can be denied dividends in any
situation short of fraud or clear abuse of discretion, and the California

courts recognize the sanctity of business judgment in the dividend
decision.

In one sense, however, the New Code might offer some

additional protection to the California shareholder by abandoning the
balance sheet approach in favor of a basic solvency limitation, thereby
minimizing the possibility of excessive dividends. The extent to which

shareholders will be able to control dividends through bylaw provisions
is unclear, as Section 505 of the New Code implies that restrictions on

dividends may be placed in the bylaws, but the section is silent as to
provisions which would compel dividends. Thus, it is difficult to ferret
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security [emphasis added].
50. See generally Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2nd Cir. 1968) wherein the
plaintiff, charging a violation of §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
lob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, was held to lack standing as he had
not purchased or sold stock during or after the alleged fraud. Nonetheless, the court
implied that but for the standing problem, a § 10(b) violation might have occurred where
defendant corporate officers manipulated the market value of the stock so as to be able
to purchase the shares of minority stockholders at depressed prices and effectuate their
"freeze-out." Under recent Supreme Court decisions, it appears that the shareholder
would be unable to invoke Rule lob-5 in the absence of an actual sale of shares. See,
e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
51. 11 FLETCHER, supra note 26, at §5325.
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out a single conclusion regarding the minority shareholder and corporate dividends. In some circumstances he is protected from majority
abuse; in other situations he appears vulnerable. 52 This vulnerability
may, moreover, take on added significance when the denial of dividends
is considered in conjunction with the problem of excessive corporate
salaries.
CORPORATE EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES

In many cases majority shareholders are offered corporate employment, especially in smaller or closely-held corporations. Additionally,
the articles may allow directors, who are often majority shareholders, to
provide for their own compensation in their roles as directors. 53 On the
other hand, there is little a minority shareholder can do to compel his
employment by the corporation, as such decisions are made by the board
of directors or the officers selected by the board. 54 Where majority
shareholders are employed by the corporation and minority shareholders are not, the former can compensate for loss of dividends (if none are
declared, or if minimal dividends are declared) by drawing substantial
salaries and favorable employee benefits in the form of bonuses and
expense accounts. 55
A minority shareholder may sue derivatively to recover excessive
salaries, under a corporate waste theory. 56 However such recovery is
difficult to effect, as the courts have not established definite rules of
what constitutes reasonable compensation. As in the case of dividends,
the issue is largely one of "business judgment" for the directors. 57 As
might be expected, the relevant factors leave considerable leeway for the
court. Thus executive ability, quantity of work and quality of services,
time devoted, difficulty of work, success and profits realized, general
corporate financial condition, and relative value of other corporate
salaries are all deemed relevant to fixing and assessing a reasonable
salary. 5 Therefore, it would seem that the likelihood of success of a
52. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
53. CAL. CoRP. CODE §820; New CAL. CORP. CoDE §310.
54. Even where a minority shareholder is able to secure employment or corporate
office, the majority, acting through the board of directors, may be able to remove the
minority shareholder from his position with or without cause. In California, removal
without cause is available at the end of a term in office or upon removal of the entire
board. CAL. CORP. CODE §810; New CAL. CORP. CoD §303. There may be a
shareholder's derivative action available to the minority for misuse of corporate funds if
the corporation is forced to pay damages for breach of an employment contract where
removal was without cause. OUNEAL & DERwu, supra note 15, at 53 n.47.
55. O'NEAL & DEnwiN, supra note 15, at 45.
56. Id. at 54-55.
57. Id. at 59.
58. Id.
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minority suit to recover excessive salaries is slim. 59 However, in the

extreme cases resulting in oppression of the minority, recovery may be
had. For example, a recent California case supported recovery of a
salary paid a controlling shareholder-employee who had diverted substantial corporate business to a second corporation from which he also
drew a salary. 0
As an alternative to the suit to recover an excessive salary, a viable
solution might be for the shareholder to simply sell his shares and invest

elsewhere.

In this regard, it is important whether the stock of the

corporation is closely or publicly held."'

Not only does the holder of

public stock have a ready market which is generally not available to the
close corporation shareholder, but the marketability of closely-held stock
may be additionally impaired where there is a detrimental situation
known to potential investors.62 Further, the shareholders may be faced
with "first option" -transfer restrictions, which are often utilized in the

close corporation setting.
Neither the Old nor the New Corporations Code offers specific protection to the minority shareholder being victimized by excessive corpo-

rate salaries. However, the fiduciary duty obligations of directors under
Section 820 of the Old Code and -the expanded provisions of Section

309 of the New Code offer limited protection. Given the latitude of the
business judgment rule,63 however, these provisions do not appear to
offer significant protection to the minority shareholder in this regard.
FUNDAMENTAL CORPORATE CHANGES

Fundamental corporate changes are those which substantially alter
the nature of a shareholder's investment. 64 Such changes may be
effected by certain types of article amendments, share redemptions,
59. See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 150 (1971), where the Court,
though recognizing that a controlling shareholder must have some constraints placed on
his ability to control his own salary, was willing to defer to the Internal Revenue Service
to police the matter through disallowances of unreasonable compensation as a legitimate
business expense.
60. Rankin v. Frebank, 47 Cal. App. 3d 75, 86, 121 Cal. Rptr. 348, 355 (1975). As
the statute of limitations had run, the Rankin court did not allow recovery of the salary;
however, the court indicated that but for this defect the plaintiffs could have retrieved
the excessive salaries.
61. Fales, Judicial Attitudes Toward the Rights of Minority Stockholders, 22 Bus.
LAWYER 459, 466 (1967). See generally Berger, California'sNew General Corporation
Law: Close and Closely-Held Corporations,this volume at 585.
62. Since Rule lOb-5, which is applicable upon any use of an instrumentality of
interstate commerce, see note 49 supra, requires disclosure of material facts relative to
the transaction, a shareholder seeking to sell his shares arguably may be susceptible to
liability for failing to apprise a potential buyer of the excessive salaries paid to
management.
63. See text accompanying notes 29-40 and 57 supra.
64. See generally O'NEAr &DERwiN, supra note 15, at 61.
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mergers, consolidations, and dissolutions. In each of these areas the
New Code alters the protections which are afforded to the minority
shareholders.
A.

ChangesAffecting Shares

Corporations may by article amendment seek to exchange,65 classify
or reclassify68 the corporation's outstanding shares. For example, the
result may be to eliminate preferences or to alter existing voting rights
held by minority stockholders.6 7 Limited protection for the affected
shareholder may be found in statutes requiring shareholder approval of
any such article change. Under Section 3634 of the Old Code and
Section 903(a) of the New Code, some protection is provided insofar as
any proposed fundamental amendment to the articles must be approved
by the outstanding shares of the affected class, whether or not such class
is otherwise entitled to vote. 8 Such a fundamental amendment must
also be approved by the outstanding voting shares.69 Under the New
Code, requirement for approval is a majority of the affected shareholders and a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote, 70 unless a
2
higher, or "supermajority," 71 vote is provided for in the articles.7
Section 3634 of -the Old Code, however, requires at least a two-thirds
vote to approve article amendments adversely affecting shares. 3 Hence,
in the case of any fundamental amendment which could adversely affect
65. An exchange involves trading one security for a different security or for other
property or rights. BLACK'S LAW DicrioNAR~Y 671 (Rev. 4th ed., 1968).
66. To classify stock is to group the stock and assign different rights, limitations
and preferences to the classes. See H. HENN, IAW OF C0lORPTnoNs 207 (2d ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as HEN].
67. See generally O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 15, at 61-78.
68. New CAL. COP. CODE §903 (emphasis added). This section applies if the
amendment would:
(1) Increase or decrease the aggregate number of authorized shares of such
class ...
(2) Effect an exchange, reclassification or cancellation of all or part of the
shares of such class. ....
(3) Effect an exchange, or create a right of exchange, of all or part of the
shares of another class into shares of such class.
(4) Change the rights, preferences, privileges or restrictions of the shares of
such class.
(5) Create a new class . . . .or increase the rights, preferences or privileges
or the number of authorized shares of any class having rights, preferences or
privileges prior to the shares of each class.
(6) In the case of preferred shares, divide the shares .. .into series having
different rights....
(7) Cancel or otherwise affect dividends . . . accrued . . .but. . . not...
paid.
69. New CAL. CoRP. CODE § 153.
70. New CAL. CORP. CODE §152.
71. "Supermajority" is a phrase describing any vote requiring more than a simple
majority to carry the motion. See ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 5.
72. New CAL. CORP. CODE §204(a) (5).
73. CAL. CoRn'. CODE §3634.
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his interests, the minority shareholder appears to have lost ground under
the New Code. 4 The draftsmen of the New Code explain the change
as "consistent with a general policy of the new law requiring a majority
vote for the approval of corporate acts.''75 As will be shown, this new
general policy could have broad implications for California minority
shareholders in the future.
B.

ShareRedemption

Redemption 76 of outstanding shares may be used as a mechanism for
ousting minority shareholders, particularly where the minority's shares
aggregate within redeemable classes.77 For example, if the corporation
has 10,000 total shares outstanding, 7000 of these common and 3000
redeemable preferred, the corporation could recall the preferred stock,
leaving only 7000 common shares outstanding. If the minority's shares
are all preferred, the recall could eliminate the minority shareholders
entirely.
Under the New Code, conditions may be contained in the articles
which will trigger the redemption, 8 or the redemption may be exercised
at the option of the corporation, 9 although not at the option of the
shareholder.80 Pursuant to Section 509 of the New Code, the corporation may redeem any or all of the shares subject to redemption. It
would appear, therefore, that the board of directors could selectively
reacquire the redeemable shares of minority shareholders and leave any
redeemable shares of majority shareholders outstanding. Moreover,
Section 510 of the New Code allows the reissuance of the reacquired
shares, unless such action is precluded by the articles. Thus, the
corporation could redeem the stock from certain shareholders and resell
the stock to other persons to replenish the corporate funds used in the
redemption.
Under the new redemption scheme, however, the California minority
74. This lowered vote requirement may be one of the most significant losses for
minority shareholders under the new code. For further discussion, see text accompanying note 200 infra.
75. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 58.
76. Redemption typically involves a corporation's reacquisition of shares by paying
the holder the book value or other agreed upon redemption price. See HENN, supra note
66, at 287. For a discussion of California's new treatment of redemption, see text
accompanying notes 56-66 infra.
77. O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 15, at 64.
78. New CAL. CoRp. CoDE- §402(a). To illustrate, a redemption provision may be
desirable as a less drastic alternative than dissolution in the event of deadlock. See
Elson, Shareholder's Agreements, A Shield for Minority Shareholders of Close Corporations, 22 Bus. LAWYER 449, 454 (1967). No equivalent section appears in the Old CAL.
CORP. CODE.

79. CAL. CoRp. CoDE §1101, New CAL. CoRP. CODE §509.
80. CAL. CORP. CODB §1101, New CAL. Comp. CODE §402(a), (b).
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shareholder is not entirely without protection. Redeemable shares must
be clearly identified as such on the share certificate,"' and thus a
shareholder is on notice that he is subject to foreclosure. Further,
Section 505 of the New Code states that "[n]othing in this chapter
prohibits additional restrictions upon. . . redemption of a corporation's
own shares . . . by provision in -the articles or bylaws . . . ." This
section could be construed to permit an article or bylaw requiring the
affirmative vote of the affected shareholders prior to the redemption.
Since such an approval requirement would not conflict with any provision of the New Code, it would seem to be a viable option8 2
Of course, a shareholder suit would lie if the redemption scheme were
fraudulent or in breach of the fiduciary duty of the directors.83 Thus, if
such a scheme were used solely as a device for expelling certain shareholders, there may be relief. If, however, the directors could show that
eliminating the minority was in the corporation's interest, there would be
no recovery and no protection. 4 When a shareholder has insufficient
facts to prevail in a shareholder suit based on fraud or fiduciary breach
of duty, he may still have a recourse through the federal courts for a
Rule lOb-5 violation,88 where a lesser degree of proof is required than in
actions based on common law fraud.8 6 Although no case was discovered calling for such an application of Rule 10b-5, a redemption situation can easily be conceived which would constitute fraud in the purchase or sale of shares, hence triggering the application of Rule 10b-5.
Although faced with a distinguishable set of facts in Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,87 the Court noted with
approval:
81.

CAL. CORP. CODE §2403(a), New CAL. CoRp. CODE §418(a)(4).

83.

13 FLETCHER, supra note 27, at §5829.

82. New CAL. CORP. CoDE §§204(d) (allowing articles not in conflict with
statute), 212(b) (allowing bylaws not in conflict with articles or statute).
84, E.g., Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952), wherein a
merger plan involved issuance of redeemable stock, thereby eliminating a dissenting
stockholder. The court found the merger essential to corporate survival, and hence held
the resulting squeeze-out justifiable. But see Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34
Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904), where an attempted dissolution and transfer of assets, not
for a bona fide business reason, but for the sole purpose of eliminating a disagreeable
stockholder, was set aside by the court as fraudulent
In California, shareholder approval is required for any reorganization in which holders
receive shares of the surviving corporation having different rights, preferences, privileges
or restrictions than those surrendered. New CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201(d). However, the
minority will not generally be able to control the reorganization because absent an article
or bylaw provision requiring a "supermajority" vote, see note 71 supra, a mere majority
may cause the transaction to occur. All dissenting shareholders, however, will have
dissenter's rights pursuant to Chapter 13 of the New Code. See text accompanying note
245 infra, for a further discussion of dissenter's rights.
85. See note 49 supra.
86. Susman, Use of Rule 10b-5 as a Remedy for Minority Shareholders of Close
Corporations,22 Bus. LAwYER 1193, 1198 (1967).
87. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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"[We do not] think it sound to dismiss a complaint merely because
the alleged scheme does not involve the type of fraud that is
'usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities.' We believe that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes

in connection with the purchase or sale of securities ... ."88
Therefore, in light of expanding federal protection through the liberal
application of Rule lOb-5, the California minority shareholder may have
an adequate alternative to offset the New Code's decreased protection
regarding the redemption and reissuance of corporate shares.
C. Changesin CorporateStructure
The corporate structure may be significantly affected in several ways,
including merger, consolidation, short-merger,8 9 or de facto merger. 90 In
distinguishing between the concepts of merger and consolidation, a
California court noted:
Strictly speaking, a consolidation signifies such a union as necessarily results in the creation of a new corporation and the termination
of the constituents whereas a merger signifies the "absorption of
one corporation by another which retains its name and corporate
identity with the added capital, franchises and powers of a merged
corporation." 91

Although this distinction was made as late as 1975, the New Code
eliminates consolidation as an "outmoded" method of effecting corporate change.92

Corporate merger may substantially affect a shareholder's interests.
Not only will the nature of his investment likely change (for example,
a smaller, speculative endeavor may merge with a larger, more cautious
corporation), but also his relative corporate holdings will probably
change (for example, a holder of 30 of an outstanding 100 shares may
become a holder of 30 of an outstanding 1000 shares in the new
corporation). It is, of course, possible that shareholders will not suffer
any harm in a merger-two companies may well be so symbiotic that a
merger will benefit both corporations' shareholders. Even in such a
case, however, there is the potential "loss of continued investment
88. Id. at 11 n.7, quoting A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir.
1967).

89. See text accompanying note 111 infra.

90. See text accompanying note 112 infra.
91. Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 848, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 559
(1975), citing 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,

§7041 (perm. ed. rev. 1973).

92. ASSEmBY REPORT, supra note 43, at 13.
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opportunity in the investment originally chosen."93 At the other ex-

treme, merger between two poorly operating companies could impose
management burdens of sufficient magnitude to cripple the resulting
corporation and hence destroy the shareholder's investment altogether.
Statutory protections for the shareholder in a merger situation are
generally found in shareholder approval requirements and appraisal

rights. 94 The Old Code required approval by two-thirds of the outstanding shares to effect a merger.9 5 Regarding this requirement, it has
been noted: "[B]y normally requiring two-thirds approval, the statutes
give a veto not only to the shareholders as a body, but also to minority
shareholders, at least to a minority of sufficient size (one-third of
outstanding shares plus one)."9 The New Code, however, will lower
the statutory minimum vote requirement for shareholder approval. Although high-vote provisions may be added in the articles, 97 only a
majority approval is required by the new law. 8 Additionally,
[o]n the theory that a corporation should only be required to obtain shareholder approval for acts which result in significant
changes in the rights or interests of the shareholders, ... [Section
1201 of the New Code] requires shareholder approval for a reorganization depending upon the extent to which their control of the
corporationis diluted by the transaction. 9"

Pursuant to this section, 100 shareholder approval is required only if
immediately following the reorganization the shareholders possess less
than five-sixths of the total combined voting power of the resulting
corporation. This new approach to merger approval, characterized by

the drafters as the "dilution test," ' ' is significant in at least two respects. First, the approach disregards the notions that a shareholder's
interest in a corporation is more than voting power and that some
93. Rams, ludicial Valuation of Dissenting Shareholder Interests, 8 LINCOLN L.
REV. 74, 88 (1973) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Rams].
94. Appraisal rights, or dissenter's rights, allow a holder of shares voted against a
merger to require that the corporation purchase the shares at fair market value. For a
further discussion of dissenter's rights, see text accompanying notes 126-161 infra.
95. CAL. COR. CODE §4107.
96. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking,57 CAL. L. REv. 1, 64 (1969) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
cited as Eisenberg].
97. New CAL. CORP. CODE §204(a) (5).

98. New CAL. CORP. CODE §§152, 1201.
99. ASSEmBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 93-94 (emphasis added).

100. New CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 provides inter alia:
(b) No approval of the outstanding shares . .. shall be required in the case
of any corporation if such corporation, or its shareholders immediately before
the reorganization, or both, shall own ... more than five-sixths of the
total combined voting power of the surviving or acquiring corporation or parent
party.
101. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 94.
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significance is to be attached to his maintaining a "continued investment
opportunity in the investment already chosen."' 2 This criticism is
perhaps overstated in that there are some exceptions to application of
the "dilution test." Shareholder approval may be required if any article
amendments are involved in the reorganization (as may be likely if the
"nature" of the corporation changes); 11 3 or, shareholder approval may
be required if the merger would result in shares being issued with
different rights, preferences, or privileges than those surrendered; 0 4 or,
if a close corporation is involved, two-thirds shareholder approval may
be required if the resulting corporation will be a non-close corporation. 10 5 Even if shareholder approval is required to effect a merger,
there is credible criticism to the effect that the shareholders' voice "...
is a very small voice indeed . . [because the statutes] limit the
shareholders' power to approval or disapproval of the package formulated by the board, rather than giving shareholders the right to take a
proposed merger and reformulate its details."'1 6 Second, and perhaps
more significant, is the fact that shareholders not given approval opportunity will be unable to trigger dissenter's rights, 07 which are generally
0 8
conditioned upon a shareholder's vote against a proposal.1
In summary, it would certainly seem that in the simple merger
situation the minority shareholder has lost some ground under the New
Code: approval minimums, even where approval is required, 0 9 have
dropped from a two-thirds requirement to a simple majority, and dissenter's rights have
been effectively eliminated for changes which are not
,,significant. '"110
Two other merger techniques remain to be discussed, the short merger or short-form merger and the de facto merger. In the short merger
situation, a parent and its subsidiary merge without being subjected to
the requirement of shareholder approval."' A de facto merger may
occur when there is a sale of all of a corporation's assets to a second
corporation, closely followed by a dissolution of the first corporation."'
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See text accompanying note 93 supra.
New CAL. CoRp. CODE §1201(c).
New CAL. CORP. CODE §1201(d).
New CAL. CoRp.CODE § 1201(e).
Eisenberg, supra note 96, at 62.
See note 94 supra.
In California, appraisal may be triggered by abstention or a vote against a

proposal; however, appraisal rights do not attach where shareholder approval is not
required. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §1300. For a more complete discussion of California
appraisal provisions, see text accompanying notes 126-161 infra.

109. See text accompanying note 100, infra (the dilution test may exempt certain
changes from shareholder approval requirements).
110. See note 94 supra and text accompanying note 99 supra.

111. O'NEA. & D.RwiN, supra note 15, at 69.
112. Id. at 74.
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The New Code directly addresses both of these merger techniques.
Unlike the Old Code,113 Section 1110 of the New Code authorizes the
short-form merger when the parent owns between 90 and 100 percent of
the outstanding shares of a merging subsidiary. According to the
drafters of the New Code, "[a]pproval by minority shareholders in this
11 4
case is unnecessary as their vote could not prevent the merger."
However, unlike the case of the ordinary merger, in which insufficient
dilution may exempt the transaction from the requirement of shareholder approval,"15 in the short-form merger dissenter's rights" a are specifically granted a "dissenting" shareholder notwithstanding his lack of
1
opportunity to formally express his disapproval through his vote.
Section 181(c) of the New Code codifies the de facto merger situa18
tion and brings it within the meaning of the term "reorganization.""
This codification will probably bolster the shareholders' position. Since
under the Old Code the sale of assets/de facto merger is not accorded
statutory recognition, it has heretofore been uncertain what approach
the California courts might take to protect the shareholders with respect
to dissenter's rights. On the one hand, some courts in other states have
held the de facto merger situation to be sufficiently distinct from the
ordinary merger to deny a shareholder's claim for appraisal rights when
a sale of assets is followed by liquidation." 9 On the other hand, some
jurisdictions have judicially extended the appraisal remedy to de facto
merger situations. 20 The new law eliminates this dilemma for the
California courts and
treats various methods of corporate fusion as different means to the
same end. This approach is intended to adopt and codify the socalled "de facto merger" doctrine so that the rights of shareholders
in a corporate combination do not depend upon the form in which
the transaction is cast.' 21
113. CAL. Conp. CoDn §4124 encompasses the wholly owned subsidiary only.
114. ASSEumLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 92.
115. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
116. See note 94 supra and text accompanying notes 126-161 infra.
117. New CAL... CORP. CODE §1110(i).
118. New CAL. Coap. CODE §181;
"Reorganization" means:
(c) The acquisition by one corporation in exchange in whole or in part for
its equity securities (or the equity securities of a corporation which is in control of the acquiring corporation) or for its debt securities which are not adequately secured and which have a maturity date in excess of five years after
the consummation of the reorganization, or both, of all or substantially all of
the property and assets of another corporation (a "sale-of-assets reorganization").
119. E.g., Cary, supra note 18, at 679.
120. E.g., Ferris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
121. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 27.
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The effect of the de facto merger being cast as a reorganization is to
subject the transactions to shareholder approval pursuant to Section
1201. It should be remembered that this section applies the "dilution
test" to assess the necessity of shareholder approval. 12 2 Further, although rights of compulsory repurchase and appraisal are extended to
the dissenting shareholder, presumably the reorganization which does
not sufficiently dilute the voting power (i.e. if the dilution is less than
one-sixth) would not affect dissenter's rights. 23
In summary, the sales of assets/de facto reorganization provisions of
the new California law will probably offer considerably more shareholder protection than the Old Code. Nonetheless, it might be argued -that
the New Code does not go far enough inasmuch as there remains a
notable absence of approval and appraisal rights for the minority shareholders whose voting power has been "insufficiently" diluted.' 2
The unique problems of the minority shareholder in the entire fundamental changes arena evolve from his lack of control. Although the
degree of harm suffered, if any, will always depend upon the particular
circumstances of the corporate change, the minority shareholders are at
the mercy of the majority unless precautions are taken in the corporate
drafting stages to provide the minority with additional protections. Such
protections might include high-vote provisions, which could give a
sizeable minority a "veto power," or could include delineation in the
articles of the conditions upon which corporate changes may be effected.125 In the event the minority is unable to affect the outcome of a
fundamental corporate decision, dissenter's rights may offer some compensation -tominority shareholders.
DISSENTER'S RIGHTS

Thus far, the dissenter's right to appraisal- 26 has been frequently
mentioned as a protective measure for minority shareholders. Chapter
13 of the New California Corporations Code 27 describes dissenter's
appraisal rights: where shareholder approval is required to effect a
corporate reorganization, 2 8 with some exceptions, 29 the shareholders
122. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
123. See note 100 supra.
124. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
125. As to the likelihood of pro-minority shareholder drafting actually occurring, see
text accompahying note 293 infra.
126. The right is also commonly referred to as "judicial valuation," see Rams, supra
note 93, at 74, or just "appraisal," O'NBAL & DERwiN, supra note 15, at 62.
127. New CAL. COP. CODE §§1300-1312; see also CAL. Corn,. CODE §§4300-4318
for the Old Code's appraisal provisions.
128. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
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who did not vote in favor of the reorganization will be given the right to
demand that the corporation repurchase their "dissenting shares" at fair
market value. 3 ' If there is a disagreement as to the shareholder's status
as a dissenter or if the parties are unable to agree on the fair market
value of the shares, the New Code provides for redress through the
courts."' If necessary, the courts are authorized to determine the
shareholder's status as a dissenter or a nondissenter, and to appoint
appraisers to establish the market value at which the corporation will
repurchase the shares. 3 '
Appraisal is promoted by advocates for minority shareholders' rights
as an opportunity for the minority dissenter to divest himself of his
corporate interest at an assured fair market value.' 3 Without -this
remedy, the shareholder might be forced to either tolerate an unacceptable situation or to try to sell his shares at whatever price he can obtainwith the turmoil of a reorganization quite possibly depressing the value
of the shares. 4 The appraisal remedy has its critics, however. One
commentator has noted that "[tihe appraisal statutes may be viewed
either as a bulwark for the rights of the minority, or as a lubricant to
speed the spread of majoritarianism."'' 3 This commentator explains
that appraisal statutes
Almost certainly.

. .

have made their major contributions not in

shielding the minority, but in giving greater mobility of action to
the majority-that is, to corporate managements. .

. When a

dissenting shareholder seeks to enjoin a transaction, the courts tend
to turn him away if he has the appraisal remedy available to
him.

136

This observation is especially valid in states where the appraisal remedy
is exclusive, as "exclusive" appraisal statutes eliminate remedies which
might otherwise be available to redress fraud or unfair dealings.137 In
California, the shareholder who qualifies as a dissenting shareholder is
denied other remedies:
No shareholder of a corporation who has a right under this chapter
130. New CAL.Coap. CoDE §1300(a).
131. New CAL. CORP. CODE §1304(a).
132. New CAL.CoRP. CODE §1304(c).
133. O'NEa. & DERwN, supranote 15, at 62.
134. But see text accompanying notes 61-62 supra. A shareholder facing withheld
dividends may be forced to divest, but a fair price is not guaranteed. Arguably, lack of
dividend declaration may substantially affect the corporate interest, thus falling within
the test suggested by the drafters for granting appraisal rights. See text accompanying
note 100 supra.
135. Manning, The Shareholder'sAppraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE LJ.223, 230 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Manning].
136. Id. at 227.
137. O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 15, at 71-72.
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to demand payment of cash for the shares held by the shareholder
shall have any right at law or in equity to attack the validity of

a reorganization or merger ....138
It would appear, however, that a shareholder who does not qualify to
demand repurchase would still be able to obtain redress. For example,
a shareholder whose voting power is insufficiently diluted by the merger' 319 is not eligible for dissenter's rights and arguably could challenge
the reorganization in the courts. It should be noted -that the Old
Code' 40 lacks the conditional language which triggers dissenter's rights
is
in the New Code, i.e. "If the approval of the outstanding shares ..
not
shareholder
any
Old
Code,
under
the
Hence,
.
.
".
required .
voting in favor of a reorganization is granted dissenter's rights, and
presumably this includes an abstaining shareholder as well, since the
language of the statute grants dissenter's rights to any shares not voted
in favor of the reorganization or merger.' 42 Under either the Old Code
or the New Code, shareholders who do not qualify for dissenter's rights
by virtue of voting in favor of the plan would still not be able to
successfully attack the transaction, as the affirmative vote would certainly raise a consent defense.
The New Code contains additional dissenter provisions: (1) "[t1o
encourage fair treatment of dissenters,"' 48 the corporation must pay the
costs of an appraisal action if the appraisal price exceeds the originally
offered price; 44 and (2) if the court-appraised price is greater than 125
percent of the originally offered price, the court may award attorney's
costs, plus interest.1 45 From a dissenter's perspective these additional
protective measures may appear inadequate in that the dissenter will
have to possess shares of substantially greater value than the corporaiton's offer in order to recover all the costs of maintaining his right to be
paid fair market value. Faced with the likelihood of attorney's fees not
being awarded (whenever the shares are assessed at less than 125
percent of the offer),' 4 6 the dissenting shareholder is apt to accept the
corporation's offer, knowing it to be low, but also knowing it would
probably cost him more to compel the payment of fair market value
through the courts. Thus, it would seem that the corporation's incentive would be to slightly underbid the value of shares, gambling on the
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

New CAL. CORP. CODE -§1312(a).
See text accompanying note 100 supra.
CAL. CoP,. CODE §4301.
New CAL. CORP. CODE §1300(a) (emphasis added).
New CAL. CORP. CODE §1300(b) (2).
ASSEMbLY REPoxT, supra note.43, at 99.
New CAL. CORp. CODE §1305(e).
New CAL. CoRP. CODE §1305(e).
New CAL. CoRP. CODE §1305(e).
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likelihood that the shareholder will not force the issue to court. On the
other hand, the Old Code makes no provision for the recovery of
attorney's fees, and thus the shareholder receiving an obviously insufficient offer from the corporation will be in a better position than he is
under the Old Code.147
The New Code follows the Delaware lead in limiting dissenter's
appraisal rights to non-exchange-listed corporations.1 48 Section
1300(b)(1) of the New Code exempts from the dissenter's provisions
any corporation listed on a national securities exchange or on the Overthe-Counter Market by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, unless at least five percent of such shareholders claim dissenter's
rights. The rationale for this exemption is that a holder of listed shares
"may cash out by selling his shares in the market if a liquid market for
his shares exists .... "149 Although such an exemption probably does
not defeat the purpose of dissenter's provisions, i.e. to give the dissenting shareholder an opportunity to divest at fair market value, one might
question whether the possible deterrent effect of appraisal might be lost
in the future. Under the Old Code,5 0 the imminence of having to
apply corporate funds to such purchases may foster a more conservative
management attitude toward reorganization. With the "exchange exemption," the corporation is freer to reorganize without fear of depletion
brought about by the compulsory repurchase of dissenting shares.
Though the dissenter may still have a financially fair remedy in the
marketplace, he is nonethless deprived of a bargaining position potentially gained by notifying the corporation considering reorganization
that he intends to assert his appraisal rights.
In assessing dissenter's appraisal remedy, it would be fair to note that
most of the commentators seem to view appraisal as a satisfactory
remedy for a distressed shareholder. Indeed, many authorities advocate
the extension of appraisal rights to a broad range of circumstances,""1
including, for example, merger, consolidation (in states where this is
still a recognized method of corporate fusion), 15 2 sale of assets, changes
in corporate purpose, changes in shareholder's rights, and changes in the
duration of corporate existence.153 It has been suggested that minority
147. CA.. Colp. CODE §4313.

148. See Rams, supra note 93, at 75.
149. ASSEMLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 96.
150. CAL. CoRP. CoDE §4300 et seq.

151. See, e.g., Rams, supra note 93; Jennings, supra note 2, at 206; Note,

Jones v.

Ahmanson: The Fiduciary Obligations of Majority Shareholders, 70 CoLuM. L. Rnav.
1079, 1096 (1970). But see, Manning, supra note 135, at 227.

152. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
153. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 135, at 262-65, for a list of states allowing
dissenter's rights for the circumstances herein listed.
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shareholders' rights could be considerably augmented by extending
appraisal statutes to cover all transactions which substantially affect the
stockholder.154 The courts have added some support to such an extension of appraisal rights. For example, in Farnsworth v. Massey'" an
appraisal remedy was fashioned for a breach of the majority shareholder's fiduciary duty to the minority. Additionally, the courts have expanded the nature of the remedy by taking a broad view of what
constitutes fair market value. In addition to the actual market price of
the shares, there is a modem trend toward:
1. Judicial recognition of the essentially involuntary nature of the
sale of dissenting shares, predicated upon the loss of continued investment opportunity in the investment originally chosen . . and]
2. Legal recognition that the loss of an investment opportunity is
the loss of a property right, which can permit the award of consequential damages for resultant tax liabilities, hitherto treated as
damnum absque injuria.'56
Thus, the California court in Jones v. Ahmanson 5 7 recognized that
market price alone would not sufficiently compensate the minority. The
facts in that case were conducive to augmenting the market price in that
the defendants' acts resulting in capture of the market and depression of
the market price were significant factors in establishing their breach of
duty to the minority.' 58 In the course of the opinion, the court stated
that the "[rIeceipt of an appraised value reflecting book value and
earnings alone could not compensate the minority shareholders for the
1 investment value. If the courts are Willingto
loss of this potential' 59
incorporate such considerations into their appraisal values, minority
shareholders are at least compensated to some degree for the actual loss
they may suffer in a reorganization commenced against their will. As
will be discussed below, 160 one might suspect that the overall tone of the
New Code will imply new guidelines for the courts evaluating consequences to the minority. In some significant respects, protections to the
minority are statutorily diminished,' 61 and the courts may well infer that
154. O'NEAL & DERwIN,supra note 15, at 199.
155. 365 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1963). See also text accompanying note 96 supra.
156. Rams, supra note 93, at 88. He expands:
For example the dilution of investment position in a going concern resulting
from merger or consolidation.. . 'and, the tax liabilities attaching to a sale of
shares, bordering on the involuntary, which in many instances is unplanned in
terms of tax avoidance, integrity of investment portfolio and related aspects of
estate preservation and growth. Id. at 87.
157. 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
158. Id. at 112-114, 460 P.2d at 474-76, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 602-604.
159. Id., at 117, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
160. See text accompanying note 200 infra.
161. See text accompanying note 200 infra.
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current legislative policy comprehends a shift away from allowing extraordinary consideration for the minority in an appraisal situation as
well.
ISSUANCE OF STOCK AND PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS

The minority shareholders' corporate interest can be substantially
depleted by the issuance of new stock. Such an issuance can be
oppressive to the minority depending upon the number of shares involved, the timing of the issuance, and whether preemptive rights are
involved. 16 2 Preemptive rights afford existing shareholders the first
right to purchase newly issued shares, in proportion to their existing
holdings. 63 Such rights must usually be provided for in the articles in
order to attach.""4
Though preemptive rights are designed to preserve shareholders'
positions in the corporation, this effect can be circumvented by several
methods. First, preemptive rights could be granted on a class basis.1"5
If the minority's shares are predominantly limited to one or two classes

of shares, the denial of preemptive rights to that (those) class(es)
would allow issuance of new stock to operate as a squeeze
technique' 6 6-- particularly where the majority shareholders do have
preemptive rights attached to their classes of shares. Second, even
where granted to all classes, preemptive rights can be of limited value to
the minority in some cases. For example, the -time frame for exercise of
the right may be made very brief. The majority, knowing of an immi-

nent new issue, can be financially prepared to purchase additional
shares. In contrast, if the new issue is declared at a time when the
minority shareholders are known to be at a financial disadvantage, the
majority may be able to accurately predict that the minority will not
exercise their preemptive rights.' 6 7 In this regard, the volume of the
162. See O'NEAL & DERwIN, supra note 15, at 91-95.
163. Id. at 92.
164. New CAL. CoRp. CoDE §204(a)(2). In the nature of an exception to the
requirement that preemptive rights must be granted in the articles is the judicial doctrine
of quasi-preemptive rights. The California court describes this doctrine in Sheppard v.
Wilcox, 210 Cal. App. 2d 53, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1962), where a group of shareholders
caused shares to be issued to themselves in order to change their position from minority
to majority. Quoting from the New York case of Dunlay v. Avenue M. etc. Co., 253
N.Y. 274, 174 N.E. 917 (1930), the court noted:
"One formula of fair dealing is universally recognized, i.e., directors may not
authorize the issue of unissued shares to themselves for the primary purpose of
converting them from minority to majority shareholders. .. ." Under these
circumstances, a shareholder in California is said to have quasi-preemptive
rights.
210 Cal. App. 2d at 60, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 417. See also Shaw v. Empire Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 186 Cal. App. 2d 401, 9 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1960).
165. See generally CAL. CoRe. CODE §3601(f).
166. See note 13 supra.
167. O'NnM. & DERwiN, supra note 15, at 94.
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new issuance is significant. If many new shares are issued, the maintenance of relative holdings may require a substantial outlay of funds. In
light of these limitations on the effectiveness of preemptive rights, it may
be that the most effective protection for the minority would be an article
provision which controls the circumstances of share issuance, thereby
allowing the small investor to evaluate in advance the potential of a
detrimental issuance.
VOTING RIGHTS

Of fifteen "principal rights" of shareholders listed in Fletcher'sCyclopedia of Corporations,'68 seven are directly related to the shareholders'
vote. In addition to the right to vote at shareholders' meetings and the
right to elect directors and officers, shareholders effect the following
rights through their vote: adoption of bylaws, amendment of the corporate charter, reorganization, consolidation, merger, and voluntary dissolution.16 9 An examination of the New Code reveals a decrease in the
protective measures associated with the shareholder vote.
A.

Cumulative Voting

The cumulative vote is regarded as a technique to assure minority
representation on the board of directors. 1 0 Though there is valid
criticism to the contrary, some authorities consider the presence of a
minority director -to be a positive corporate influence. O'Neal and
Derwin suggest that the minority representative serves as a watchdog on
the board, creating "fear" among the majority that any misdeeds will be
reported to the constituency."" However, other commentators conclude that the value of cumulative voting may be overestimated. One
such commentator contends that the minority board member may be
ineffectual-he may be excluded from executive session and from informal agreements, and may not be able to persuade the majority to this
viewpoint. 7 2 Thus, in some situations the minority director may have
no impact upon corporate affairs.
Like Section 2235 of the Old Code, Section 708 of the New Code
mandates that California corporations afford the shareholders the right
168. 13 FLETCHER, supra note 27, §5717.
169. Id.
170. The cumulative vote works as follows: "Each share carries as many votes as
there are vacancies to be filled, the shareholder being permitted to distribute the votes for
all his shares among the candidates in any way he desires." HENN, supra note 66, at
364.
171.

O'NEA

& DER wN, supra note 15, at 116-17.

172. Mattes, The Burden of the Corporate Director Elected Noncumulatively, 63
CAL. L. REv. 463, 465 (1975).
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to cumulate their votes.17 3 However, certain board functions may be
delegated to an executive committee, 17 4 from which a minority director
could presumably be excluded, although matters of "fundamental importance" are reserved to the full board (for example, the declaration of
dividends or the amendment, adoption, or repeal of bylaws). 17 In one
article which characterizes the cumulative vote as a factor which discourages corporate promoters from incorporating in California, the
author offers the use of the executive committee as a mitigating factor:
[I]f dissention should arise on the board, the use of an executive
committee by the majority directors would mitigate its effects.
Even though an executive committee might not eliminate the more
conservative management attitude that could result from constant
criticism, it would enable the corporation to retain a smoothly functioning administrative team of directors. 1 6
In addition to the use of an executive committee, there are other ways
to circumvent the effects of the cumulative vote. In some states a

director may be removed without cause and majority representatives
may then be appointed to fill the vacancy.

Sections 810 of the Old

Code and 303(a)(1) of the New Code protect the minority's representative by providing, in effect, a cumulating of votes in the removal

decision as well as in the election decision: "No director may be removed... [without cause] when the votes cast against removal . . .
would be sufficient to elect such director if voted cumulatively at the
election at which the same total number of votes were cast. .... "1
173. Though retained in the finally enacted version of the New Corporations Code,

it is interesting to note the apparently decreasing stature of the cumulative vote. Pursuant to article 7, §17, the cumulative vote enjoyed constitutional status in California prior
to 1930; after that date it assumed a statutory role. See Mattes, supra note 172, at 465.
Even though retained in the new law, the drafts of A.B. 376 (1975-76 Regular Session),
which enacted the New California Corporations Code, called for permissive rather than
for mandatory cumulative vote. Further, it appears that cumulative voting may be
eliminated pursuant to a shareholders' agreement under Section 300(b) of the New
Code. It would appear that opponents are gradually gaining support, and one might well
suspect its elimination as a mandatory provision in the not too distant future.
Among the objections raised by cumulative vote opponents are:
[1] The -possibility that a rival company might be able to plant a spy on the
board of directors in order to obtain commercial secrets. [2] [Tihe presence
on the board of a crank or the representative of a dissident faction might impede its smooth functioning, or might tend to make the management overly
conservative and unwilling to take necessary risks. [3] [UInder cumulative
voting an individual shareholder might find it somewhat easier to induce corporate action favorable to his interests alone.
However, as noted by the author of these observations, a 1951 study indicated these
typically cited problems occur only infrequently, if at all. Comment, Choice of a
CorporateDomicile, 49 CAL. L. REV. 518, 525 (1961).
174. CAL. Co p. CoDE §501, New CAL. CORP. CODE §311.
175. CAL. COP. CODE §501, New CAL. CoRP. CoDE §311.
176. Comment, Choice of a Corporate Domicile, 49 CAL. L. REv. 518, 525 (1961)
(footnotes omitted).
177. New CAL. Cup. CODE §303(a) (1).
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Reduction of the number of directors can also circumvent the cumulative vote. For example, a 20 percent shareholder would be able to
cumulatively elect a member of a five member board, but could not elect
a representative if the board were reduced to three or four. The
minimum number of directors allowed in California is three. 1 8 According to Section 303(b) of the New Code, the number of directors may
not be reduced to remove a director during his term, but such a
reduction may be accomplished between terms. Since only a majority
vote is required to amend the corporate articles to reduce the number of
directors, this manner of circumventing the cumulative vote would at
first appear viable in California, provided there is compliance with
Section 303(b). However, the minority shareholders have an added
protection against this method of squeezing out their interests as Section
212(a) of the New Code allows, in effect, a cumulative vote on this
issue as well. 1 9
"Staggered" boards also may negative the impact of the cumulative
vote. If only one or two directors are elected at any one time, the
cumulative vote may not produce enough votes to elect a director.
However, it would appear that Section 301 of the New Code precludes
staggered boards in California. On first reading this conclusion is not
obvious: "The articles may provide for the election of one or more
directors by the holders of the shares of any class of series. ....,10
However, since elections must be held annually and the terms of office
are only one year,' 8 ' it may be inferred that the "may provide for one or
more directors to be elected" language refers to assigning directors to
particular classes, rather than to staggering the board.
Thus, although there are indications that support for the mandatory
cumulative vote is weakening,'
California law still preserves this right
for the minority, and the law contains sufficient safeguards to prevent
circumventing the cumulative vote by reducing the number of directors
or by staggering the elections. There are, however, two respects in
which the effectiveness of the cumulative vote may have suffered by
178. New CAL. CORP. CODE §212(a). Pursuant to this section there are, however,
exceptions that allow as few as one director if all shares are yet unissued or if there are
only one or two shareholders.
179. New CAL.CoRP.CODE §212(a) provides inter alia:

a bylaw or amendment of the articles reducing the number or the minimum
number of directors cannot be adopted if the votes cast against its adoption at
a meeting or the shares not consenting in the case of action by written consent
would be sufficient to elect at least one director if voted cumulatively at an
election at which all of the outstanding shares entitled to vote were voted and
the entire number of previously authorized directors were then being elected
(emphasis added).
180. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §301 (emphasis added).
181. New CAL. CORP.CODE §301(a).

182. See text accompanying note 173 supra.
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adoption of the New Code. Section 708(b) of the New Code requires
that the candidates' names be placed on the ballot prior to the voting
and at least one shareholder must have expressed an intention to vote
cumulatively prior to the election."8 3 While these prerequisites shift
some of the burden to the minority shareholders, the overall effect upon
the exercise of the cumulative vote may be insignificant."
B.

"Supermajority'"Vote Requirements

In addition to the cumulative vote, minority shareholders may find
vote-related protection in "supermajority" vote requirements, that is,
requirements which call for two-thirds, ninety percent, or even unanimous shareholder approval to give effect to certain measures. By
requiring at least a two-thirds vote, minority shareholders in sufficient
numbers (one-third of the outstanding shares plus one) are given a veto
power with which to protect their interests."' 4 Such high-vote provisions are required in many states to effect fundamental changes, such as
charter amendment, merger, consolidation, or sale of assets.'8 5
Under the Old Code, a two-thirds vote is required to approve loans or
guarantees to corporate officers, directors, or others;' s to effect a stock
purchase plan without exercising preemptive rights; 8" to authorize the
corporate purchase of shares out of reduction surplus; 8 to amend the
articles;' 8 9 or to approve a consolidation of merger plan.9 0 Additionally, unanimous shareholder approval is required -to hold a corporate
meeting at a place other than the principal corporate office (unless
otherwise specified in the bylaws),' 9 ' and unanimous approval is required to recover an assessment on fully paid shares.' 92 The New Code
calls for a majority vote in all the above circumstances unless there are
contrary provisions in the bylaws.' 9 3 The rationale for -this lowering of
the vote requirement is that "corporate actions should be subject to
control by a majority" of the shareholders.' 94
As mentioned above, however, there is authorization in the New
Code, as there has been in the past,' 95 for a greater-than-majority vote
REvmw oF SELECTrD 1975 CALYnoRNiA LEGISLATION, this volume at 268.
184. Eisenberg, supra note 96, at 64. See also text accompanying note 80 supra.
185. O'NEAL & DEXWIN, supra note 15, at 62.
186. CAL. Coap. CODE §823. See also 15 CAL. JUR. 3d, Corporations§288 n.27.
187. C&L. CoRp. CODE §1108.
188. CAL. CoRP. CODE §1906,
189. CAL. CoRP. CODE §3634.
190. CAL. CoRP. CODE §4107.
191. CAL. CORP. CODE §2210.
192. CAL. CORP. COE §3639.
193. New CAL. CORP. CODE §§315, 903.
183.

194. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 90.
195. See CAL. CORP. CODE §500.
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for all but election of directors and the voluntary dissolution vote. To
effect a supermajority vote requirement, a provision embodying this
requirement must be written into the articles or bylaws.1 96 In this
regard the code's drafters noted:
This "super-majority" vote requirement for approval of certain corporate acts is frequently desired in close corporations for the protection of a minority shareholder against adverse joint action by
other shareholders. Additionally, a higher percentage requirement
where special
may be useful in non-close corporations, particularly
197
protection is desired for a certain class of shares.
This legislative recognition of the protective nature of a high-vote
provision is significant in that a legislative policy can possibly be inferred: the legislature considered and rejected a high-vote posture in
favor of a more management-oriented majority vote. The impact of this
new California policy in favor of majoritanism may go well beyond the
obvious effect of requiring the approval of fewer shareholders to carry a
measure. The courts, when faced with litigation between the shareholder and the corporation or the shareholder and a director, are reluctant to
grant relief where doing so would impinge upon either the business
judgment of management or the principal of majority rule. 98 As one
authority has noted, the "unavoidable result of the fundamental principal that the majority can regulate and control the lawful exercise of the
powers"'19 9 is that the courts will not interfere in favor of the minority
absent a plain showing that an action is contrary to the corporation's
interest and that the director(s) ".
subserve some outside purpose. .

.
.

. must have acted with an intent to
in a manner inconsistent with...

[the corporation's] interest."'2 0 With such judicial reluctance to interfere with majority rule in mind, the legislative policy which may be
inferred from the two-thirds vote provisions contained in the Old Code
is significant. The courts might justifiably rely upon legislative expressions that in certain circumstances the minority's special interests are to
be protected, even at the expense of majority.2"1 To whatever degree
196. A bill currently before the legislature, A.B. 2849 (1975-76 Regular Session),
would amend §902 of the New Code so that provisions in the articles of incorporation
calling for a larger proportion of the votes of the directors or shareholders to carry an
issue than those provided in the general corporation law shall not be altered, amended or
repealed except by the greater vote unless otherwise provided for in the articles.
197. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 38.
198. O'NEA. & DmtwiN, supra note 15, at 42. See also text accompanying note 57
supra.
199. 13 FLETCHmR, supra note 27, at §5821.
200. Id.
201. See Cary, supra note 18, at 670. Speaking of judicial interpretations in
Delaware, Cary noted that
the courts have undertaken to carry out the "public policy" of the state and
create a "favorable climate" for management. Consciously or unconsciously,
fiduciary standards and the standards of fairness generally have been relaxed.
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the simple majority voting provisions contained in the New Code foreshadow a shift away from minority interest in favor of the majority and
management, the courts may in the future infer a mandate to reassess
their consideration of minority shareholder's rights.
CORPORATE RECORDS AND REPORTS

Access to corporate records and information may be an important
factor in protecting minority rights. Whether or not the minority is
represented on the board, the ability to inspect essential corporate
documents may give the minority an opportunity to monitor majority
and board activities. This in itself could be an effective control against
misdealings.20 2 Though minority shareholders generally have a right to
receive certain information regarding corporate activities, 203 this right is
not unlimited. 0 4
The New Corporations Code considerably augments the shareholder's
right to receive information from the corporation. The Old Code allows
a shareholder to inspect corporate records and to extract information
therefrom for any purpose reasonably related to a shareholder's interests
as such. 20 5 The new law will grant a five percent shareholder an
absolute right to inspect and copy stockholders lists, and it will allow a
similar right -toany shareholder conditioned upon a reasonable relation
2
to his or her interest as a shareholder. 20 6 Other corporate records 0r
also will be accessible for inspection and copying for any shareholderrelated purpose. 208
Reports to the shareholders also lend a degree of visibility to corporate activities, and thus help conform such activities to the best interests
of the shareholders. The Old Code allows financial reports to be
waived by bylaw or article provisions. 2 9 Under the New Code, however,
annual financial reports to the shareholders are required;210 and waiver
is allowed only for corporations having 100 or fewer shareholders.
202. See Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CAL. L. REv. 408, 409:
"[d]isclosure is the most realistic means of coping with the ever-present problem of
conflicts of interest [in a business enterprise]."
203. 13 FLETCHER, supra note 27, at §5818.
204. Goldstein v. Lees, 46 Cal. App. 3d 614, 621, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253, 257 (1975),
wherein the court noted:
[Allthough shareholders have some rights to corporate information not available to the general public, shareholder status does not in and of itself entitle
an individual to unfettered access to corporate confidences and secrets ....
205. CAL. CORP. CODE §3003.
New CAL. CORP. CODE §1600.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

E.g., accounting books and minutes. New
New CAL. CORP. CODE §1601 (a).
CAL. CORP. CODE §3006.
New CAL. CORP. CODE §1501.

CAL. CORP. CODE

§ 1601.
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Moreover, even if annual reports are waived," 1 ' any shareholder will be
able to 2compel the production of certain corporate financial state21
ments.
Additionally, Section 1501(b) of the new law expands the disclosure
requirements mandated by Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.213 The 1934 Act calls for disclosure of any
transactions between -the corporation and its officers or directors or
between the corporation and any ten percent shareholder. However,
that Act applies only to corporations with more than 500 shares, with
assets greater than $1,000,000 and which are engaged in interstate
commerce.2 14 California's New Code increases the visibility of corporate activities by extending similar disclosure requirements to cover
smaller, non-listed corporations which are exempt from federal Section
16(b) disclosure requirements. 15
Finally, the New Code reduces from ten percent to five percent the
shareholder interest required to compel an income statement,2 16 again
serving to bring corporate activities within the view of minority shareholders. Just as a minority director on the board may serve as a
watchdog to keep corporate activities in line with the interests of shareholders,2 17 the knowledge that five-percent shareholders can compel the
production of records may serve to lessen -the likelihood of misdealings.
Cary supports this contention, saying in essence that disclosure is a
"prophylactic" which prevents people from taking an action they know
might be publicized. 1 8 If such a contention is correct, the increased
accessibility of corporate records represents perhaps the most significant
of the few additional shareholder protections afforded by the New Code.
MEETINGS AND QUORUMS

By failing to hold shareholders' meetings, the corporation may be able
21 9
to suppress much of the shareholders' influence on the corporation.
At the meetings the shareholders elect directors, review corporate activities and vote on those corporate activities which require shareholder
approval. As with many other oppressive techniques described thus far,
the minority shareholder may be uniquely affected in that, lacking
actual control, he might often rely upon the examination of corporate
211. New CAL.

212. New

CORP. CODE

§1501 (a).

CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(d).

213. 15 U.S.C. §78p (1934).
214. 15 U.S.C. §781 (1934).

215. New CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(b).
216. CAL. CORP. CODE §3011 (requiring 10% holdings to compel a statement); New

CAL. CORP. CODE, §1501(c) (requiring 5% holdings).
217. See text accompanying note 171 supra.
218. Cary, supra note 18, at 700.
219. O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 15, at 113.
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affairs that may occur at shareholders' meetings as an indirect control
220
upon those affairs.
In California annual meetings are required, and under the New Code
shareholders are offered an expanded opportunity to compel the annual
meeting should the corporation attempt to avoid it.2 21 Moreover, under
the New Code2 22 special meetings may be induced by 10 percent of the
voting shareholders, whereas the Old Code requires -the affirmative vote
228
of 20 percent of the voting shareholders to compel a special meeting.
Even though an annual meeting or special meeting is called, there are
ways to circumvent the purpose and effectiveness of a shareholders'
meeting. One method is to hold a meeting at a relatively inaccessible
location. California law allows out-of-state meeting places to be provided for in the bylaws.22 4 A shareholder looking for protection against
remote shareholders' meetings should seek a bylaw specifying a particular convenient location, or should look for -the absence of a bylaw
specifying out-of-state meetings; in the absence of a contrary bylaw, the
meeting must be held at the principal executive offices of the corporation.

22 5

Another method of minimizing the effectiveness of shareholders'
meetings can be found in very low quorum requirements. The Model
Business Corporations Act of the American Bar Association suggests
that a majority of the voting shares should be represented in order to
constitute a quorum, and in no case should less than one-third of the
voting shares comprise a quorum. 226 Thus, if less than one-third of the
shares are represented at the meeting, some authorities suggest that the
meeting inadequately represents the interests of the shareholders. 2 A
high quorum requirement, on the other hand, secures to the minority a
veto power, since if a sufficient minority fail to attend a meeting, any
transaction requiring shareholder approval will be precluded.
220. It has been suggested by some corporate managers that the visibility of
corporate affairs gained through disclosure requirements obviates the need for shareholder's meetings. But Cary concludes, "[mianagement's action . .. should be disclosed to
and monitored by outside groups; as a practical matter this group should be the
shareholders." Cary, supra note 18, at 699.
221. New CAL. CORP. CODE §600(c) allows any shareholder to petition directly to
superior court to compel the meeting. But see CAL. CoRP. CODE §2240, which currently
limits remedial action to the Attorney General who may, upon complaint of a shareholder, notify the corporation of the complaint, after which the corporation has 30 days to
reply before the Attorney General may institute court action to compel the meeting.
222. New CAL. CORP. CODE §600(d).
223. CAL. COuP. CODE §2202(c).
224. CAL. CoRP.CODE §815; New CAL. CORP. CODE §600.
225. CAL. CORP. CODE §815; New CAL. CouP. CODE §600.
226. CMmrrrEE ON CORPORATE LAws OF Tu

BusINESS CoRpoRAnoNs Act 32 (rev. 1969).

AMERICAN BAR AssOCrON, MODEL

227. See 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,

§2013 (perm. ed. rev. 1967).
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The Old Code establishes a quorum at a majority of the voting stock,
with different provisions allowable by article or bylaw in the case of a
The New Code
non-profit corporation or a mutual water company.2
bylaws of any
or
articles
the
also sets the quorum at a majority; however,
but a close corporation may provide for a quorum between one-third
and majority.2 29 The Old Code's lack of restrictions on the quorum in
the non-profit setting allows quorums ranging from very low to very
high. Thus, a minority shareholder could be very susceptible to
majoritarian abuse in the case of low quorum requirements, or could
occupy a protected and even controlling position in the case of high
quorum requirements. The New Code, by setting the maximum
quorum at a majority of the outstanding shares, effectively eliminates
minority control, yet it precludes very low (below one-third) quorums,
thereby protecting against that potential abuse. In the "for profit" setting, on the other hand, the New Code will allow lower quorum
requirements than the Old Code, which could be viewed as a slight
decrease in minority protection. To ensure maximum protection of his
interests, a minority shareholder should seek establishment of the maximum quorum number allowable (fifty percent plus one), o and should
seek bylaw or article provisions specifying convenient meeting places.
SALE OF CONTROL

Litigation of minority shareholder rights is often based upon the saleof-control situation, 231 the court being asked to determine if non-controlling stockholders should be allowed to share in the profits realized in
the sale. The basis of the dispute stems from a theoretical disagreement
as to the nature of corporate control. Generally, two views of corporate
control and its sale are recognized. One view holds that the sale of
control is similar to the sale of any other kind of property, thus the
owner may sell at a profit without obligation to share the profit (or
premium as it is generally called) with other shareholders.2 32 The other
view is that dominant shareholders are in a position to influence and
control corporate affairs, and therefore the controlling shareholders owe
a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to the minority shareholders. 2 3
228. CAL. CoRp. CODE §2211.

229. New CAL. CoRp. CODE §602(a).
230. This result could also be assured if the articles were silent as to quorum, as the
presumption would then be a 50% plus one quorum. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §602(a).
231. Note, Jones v. Ahmanson, The Fiduciary Obligations of Majority Shareholders,
70 CoLuM. L Rv. 1079, 1086 (1970). The author notes that prior to Jones v.
Ahmanson, the only cases prevailing on breach of fiduciary duty theories were those in
which the breach involved a negligent sale of control to looters.
232. Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 738 (1971).
233. Id. at 741.
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Under this view, if the sale of controlling shares can be interpreted as a
sale of stock only, the selling stockholder may retain the full price
received.234 On the other hand, if the controlling stockholder was paid
to transfer control, he is under obligation to share the premium (that
portion of the price received which can be attributed to the control
factor apart from the bare share value) with the other stockholders. 23 5
California modernly follows the latter approach in evaluating the sale
of control situation. In a recent shareholder's derivative action against a
former majority shareholder who sold to a "looter,"235 a California
appellate court in Debaun v. First Western Bank2 37 described the evolution of California case law in this area:
Early case law held that a controlling shareholder owed no duty
to minority shareholders or to the controlled corporation in the
sale of his stock.... Decisional law, however, has since recognized

the fact of financial life that corporate control... may be misused.
Thus the applicable proposition now is that "in any transaction
where the control of the corporation is material," the controlling
majority shareholder must exercise good faith and fairness "from
the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein. '238
The particular concern of the minority shareholder in a sale of control
situation is that if the sale meets the standards of "good faith and
fairness,""" there is no recourse, such as dissenter's rights. For example, the buyer of control may be inexperienced or may be a poor
corporate manager, but neither inadequacy will satisfy the "intent to do
harm" standard suggested by the Debaun court. 240 Short of negligence
sufficient to characterize the conduct of the new controlling shareholder
as a breach of fiduciary duty,241 the minority shareholder may find
investment expectations substantially altered with no recourse short of
selling his shares on the open market.
The courts' recognition of this susceptibility is evidenced by the
judicial approach to the sale of control cases. The minority sharehold234. Id. at 741-42.
235. Id. at 742.
236. A "looter" is one who, in bad faith, misappropriates and depletes corporate
assets. See DeBaun v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 120 Cal. Rptr.
354 (1975).
237. Id. at 696, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60 (citations omitted).
238. Id. at 696, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60.
239. The DeBaun court went on to describe the qualities of "good faith" to include a
duty to investigate the buyer whenever there are circumstances from which a reasonable
person would suspect the potential buyer intended to harm the corporation or its
shareholders. Id. at 696, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
240. Id.
241. For a discussion of fiduciary standards pursuant to §309 of the New Code, see
Comment, California'sNew General Corporation Law: Directors' Liability to Corporations, this volume at 613.
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ers are "compensated" by allowing their participation in the premium
proceeds.2 42 This modem approach followed by the California courts
affords the minority shareholder a fair consideration not available in
states following the older, personal property approach to sale of control.2 43 Although one might expect the California courts to reassess
their consideration of minority shareholders in light of those provisions
in the New Code which seem to favor majoritarianism, the judicial
theory in the sale of control cases does not rest wholly upon policy
244
considerations, but also upon a characterization of control as an asset.
Thus, the minority shareholder could probably expect the court's protective posture to continue in this instance.
INvOLUNTARY DissoLuTON

The oppressed minority shareholder may find that involuntary dissolution offers the appropriate solution to his or her situation. Involuntary dissolution involves a "qualified" shareholder petitioning the court
to wind up the affairs of the corporation.24
This is a sensitive and
extreme remedy, and though it may be discussed as a protective measure
for the oppressed stockholder, it must be considered a possible squeeze
technique as well. 246 The New Code extends the right to petition for
dissolution to a broader range of persons, and it narrows the grounds
upon which dissolution may be sought.
Under the New Code, the action to dissolve may be initiated by onehalf or more of the directors, by at least one-third of the shareholders,
by any shareholder in a close corporation, or by any person specified in
the articles. 2 47 These new provisions differ from those contained in the
Old Code 24s in several important respects. First, any shareholder in a
close corporation may petition for dissolution under the New Code,
while the Old Code neither defines nor addresses the close corporation.
From the New Code's extensive close corporation dissolution provision
one might infer a legislative recognition that in the very small corporation, the minority shareholder is more susceptible to oppression.2 4 9 In
their discussion of close corporation squeeze-outs, O'Neal and Derwin
242. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (1973); Brown v. Halbert, 271
Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (2nd Cir. 1969).
243. See, e.g., Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963) (exemplifying a state which follows the traditional

personal property approach to sale of control).
244. See, e.g., 219 F.2d 173.

245. See text accompanying note 247 infra.
246. See note 13 supra.
247. New CAL. CoP. CoDon §1800.
248. CAL. Coap. CoDn §4650.

249. See text accompanying note 254 infra.
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suggest that as a protective measure the minority shareholder should
seek to be among the persons eligible to petition for dissolution; 250 in
the close corporation setting under the New Code, this suggestion is
certainly accommodated. Second, the New Code allows an article
provision authorizing additional persons to petition for dissolution. The
Old Code requires at least one-half or more of the directors or one-third
or more of the shareholders to seek involuntary dissolution. 25 ' The New
Code's authorization is very broad, and there are no statutory limitations
upon who may be granted the opportunity to dissolve. In keeping with
the suggestion above, minority shareholders in publicly held corporations should seek to be included among the persons authorized to seek
dissolution.
To offset the broader range of persons eligible to seek dissolution
under the New Code, the grounds upon which dissolution may be
sought will be slightly more restrictive than the grounds under the Old
Code.252 The New Code requires, as one of several bases for seeking
dissolution, the conjunctive operation of (a) director deadlock and (b)
factionalization of voting shares or failure to fill vacancies on the board
for two successive annual meetings. 25" The Old Code is silent as to
dissolution based on board vacancy, and deadlock and factionalization
are each independent bases for seeking dissolution. 2 4 Thus, under the
New Code, dissolution based on deadlock may be slightly more difficult
to effect because the shareholder must first seek to resolve the deadlock
by voting in another director. From the minority's perspective, this
provision is probably more beneficial than detrimental in that the minority will have more control-if the board is deadlocked, the shareholder
has the opportunity to try to elect a director to break the deadlock; if
dissolution is desired, the vote may be cast in a manner which will
preserve the deadlock. The Old Code, on the other hand, does not
require consultation with the shareholder in the event of director deadlock.2 5
Another basis for dissolution under the Old Code is that
"liquidation. . . is reasonably necesary for the protection of the rights
or interests of any substantial number of the shareholders or of the
250. O'NEAL & DnRwN, supra note 15, at 211. See also Note, Unusual Statutory
Remedies for the Deadlocked Corporationin California: Voluntary Dissolution and the
Provisional Director, 48 CAL. L. REv. 272 (1960) (other states have more stringent
limits upon who may seek dissolution: Delaware, 2/3 vote; Illinois, unanimous or 2/3;
Iowa, unanimous, unless otherwise set in articles; Pennsylvania, unanimous unless
otherwise recommended by directors).
251. CAL. CoRp. CODE §4650.
252. See CAL. CoRp. CODE §4651.
253. New CAL. CoRP. CODB §1800(b)(2).
254. CAL. CoRp. CODE §4651(b), (c).
255. CAL. CoRp. CODE §4651(b).
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complaining shareholders. 2 56 This provision has the least definite
standards for dissolution, leaving the most leeway for judicial interpretation. This section was the subject of recent litigation in Stumpf v. C. E.
Stumpf and Sons, Inc.,25 wherein the court recognized that similar
provisions in other states had been narrowly construed to require management misconduct or deadlock in order to grant relief.258 A similar
interpretation, the court noted, had been urged by Ballantine, who
argued that broad construction "makes it too easy for an obstreperous
minority to interfere with the legitimate control and management of the
majority ....
,259 The court found, however, that the potential for
minority abuse had been recognized by the legislature, and that the
section was to be interpreted as an independent ground for dissolution.
The protection for the majority and the corporation, said the court, was
to be found in Section 4658 (of the Old Code), which provides that
opponents may prevent liquidation by buying out the shares of the
plaintiffs for dissolution at fair market value.2"' The legislature has
responded -to this broad interpretation by specifying in the New Code
that dissolution based upon "protection of the rights or interests"2 ,, of
the shareholder will be restricted to corporations having 35 or fewer
shareholders. The drafters felt this limitation was necessary because of
the broader range of persons eligible to seek dissolution,262 namely any
close corporate shareholder and anyone named in the articles.2 63 The
minority shareholder in a smaller corporation thus has retained an
avenue lost to stockholders in the larger corporation. In order to effect
dissolution in the larger corporation, stockholders must rely upon one of
the other bases listed in Section 1800, all of which allow less leeway for
judicial interpretation and require more grievous circumstances to establish the need for a winding up of corporate affairs.264
In any event, the shareholder seeking dissolution is required to petition in good faith.26 Regarding this requirement it has been written:
The duty of good faith required of a dissolving shareholder is of
a limited and selfish sort. It is not the same standard of good faith
256. CAL. CoRP. CODE §4651(f).
257. 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1975).
258. Id. at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
259. Id., quoting H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS
§318, at 308 (1938 ed.).
260. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 235, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
261. New CAL. CORP. CODE §1800(b) (5).
262. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 103.
263. See New CAL. CORP. CODE §1800(a) (2).
264. See New CAL. CORP. CODE §1800.
265. Comment, Unusual Statutory Remedies for the Deadlocked Corporation in
California: Voluntary Dissolution and the Provisional Director, 48 CAL. L. REV. 272,
273 (1960).
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used to test the actions of directors and controlling shareholders in
the general conduct of corporate affairs. Where no advantage over
the other shareholders is gained, no prejudice to third parties results, and no other way out is available, the good faith requirement
2 66
is satisfied by any conduct short of fraud.
It is upon the good faith limitations that the minority shareholder must
rely to prevent oppressive dissolution. The above comment suggests
that in such a critical matter as dissolution, the courts are willing to
subject the parties to a lesser standard than is normally required. Thus,
under such circumstances, the expanded dissolution rights contained in
the New Code may place the minority shareholder in a more vulnerable
position than he currently occupies; nonetheless, the dissolution alternative may become more accessible to the minority shareholder if he is
among the persons to whom "initiating rights" are granted.
SHAREHOLDER SUITS

Because the shareholder must often resort to the courts to vindicate
his rights, it is important to look at some of -the procedural aspects of
California law relative to shareholder litigation. In particular, two
changes in California law will be examined for their possible effect on
shareholder suits: the security-for-expense requirements and the indemnity provisions of the Old and New Codes.
A.

Security for Expenses

Security-for-expense statutes were designed to discourage the prosecution of unmeritorious claims against corporate managers and directors.267 The statutes require the shareholder plaintiff to post a bond
attributable to corporate expenses in the event the plaintiff does not
prevail.2 68 There are differing opinions as to the effect of security for
expense statutes upon shareholder litigation. One researcher found
support for the contention that the statutes had a "dramatic effect" in
producing "a substantial decline in the number of derivative suits
commenced in the New York courts."20 9 This decline caused critics of
the New York statute to conclude that the security requirement "was not
only discouraging unmeritorious claims, but also effectively preventing
minority shareholders with meritorious claims from seeking derivative
relief."2 7 On the other hand, a New York attorney interviewed by that
266. Id.
267. Comment, Security for Expenses in Shareholder's Derivative Suits: 23 Years'
Experience, 4 COLUM. J. oF LAW &Soc. PRon. 50 (1968).
268. Id. at 52.
269. Id. at 54.
270. Id. at 54.
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commentator noted that in most cases, the sophisticated defendant
might
would not move for security because by doing so the corporation 271
subject itself to additional expense in corporate time and effort.
The security for expense provisions contained in the Old Code, which
attach in derivative actions,27 2 are unique in that they require showings
by the moving corporation that (1) there is no reasonable possibility
that the suit will benefit the corporation, or (2) that the corporation
was in no way a, party to the transaction that is the subject of the
litigation. 273 Not only do these security prerequisites assure the suing
shareholder due process in any assessment of security,2 71 they somewhat
mitigate the increased security minimum imposed by the new law (raising the minimum from $25,000 to $50,000).275 The rationale for this
increased bond is to partially offset the effects of inflation upon corporate costs. 2 7 6 Although the cost of living has risen sharply since 1949
when the $25,000 security requirement was first imposed, 77 this doubling of security costs may certainly be considered a deterrent to future
shareholder derivative litigation.
B.

Indemnification

The New Code's provisions for director indemnification of expenses
incurred in litigation and in withstanding insurgent movements might
also be viewed as another deterrent to the shareholder suit. The drafters characterize -the new indemnity provisions as "substantially improved"; 278 from the perspective of management this may be so, but
from the minority's viewpoint this is doubtful. Whereas the Old Code
limits indemnity to cases where a director prevails in the litigation or
where the court approves a settlement of the claim,279 the New Code
broadens the indemnity situations to include situations where the director acts in good faith in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best
interests of the corporation. 28 0 Although the new indemnification prov271. Id. at 65.

272. CAL. CORP. CODE §834.
273. CAL. CORP. CODE §834.

274. See Comment, Due Process and Security for Expense Statutes, this volume at
176, 182-84 (1976) (concluding that the Cal. Corp. Code §834 requirements produce
"clearly the type of procedure which would be considered 'meaningful' and 'appropriate
to the nature of the case,' and therefore in keeping with the requirements of procedural
due process." (citation omitted).

275. New CAL. CORP. CODE §800(d). See also New CAL. CORP. CODE §800(b)(1)
(contemporaneous ownership requirement).
276. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 89.
277. CAL. CORP. CODE § 834, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1949, c. 499, 1, at 857.
278. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 43, at 7.
279. CAL. CORP. CODE §830.
280. New CAL. CORP. CODE §317. For further discussion of director's indemnifca-

tion, see Comment, California's New General Corporation Law: Directors' Liability to

Corporations,this volume at 613.
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isions are probably not unreasonable, the minority shareholders may
arguably find themselves in a detrimental position nonetheless. This
result may obtain simply because the directors are offered broader
opportunity for indemnification. With their risks minimized, they may
be expected to more vigorously oppose minority surges.281
SUMMARY

The minority shareholder's position in California is undergoing a
change. As shown in the preceding comments, his protection in some
instances has been broadened and strengthened by provisions in the
New Corporations Code; in other cases, his protection has decreased. A
brief summary will assist in evaluating the evolving status of the California minority shareholder.
1. Dividends28 2 -The business judgment aspects of dividend declaration make it difficult for the minority to compel dividends, but the New
Code's basic solvency limitations should afford added protection against
dividends which the corporation cannot afford. The ability to control
dividends through the articles or bylaws is uncertain, although it would
appear an unavailable alternative.
2. Employment and Salaries283--The California minority shareholder
could be victimized by majority shareholders employed by or directing
the corporation. Excessive salaries and generous benefits may offset
withheld dividends and may deplete corporate assets. The New Code
offers added protection to the minority only indirectly through new
fiduciary duty standards; however, other protective measures may be
added to the corporate charter.
3.

Corporate Changes 28 4 and Dissenter's Rights28 5-The New Corpo-

rations Code will require only a majority as opposed to a current twothirds vote to effect most corporate changes. Moreover, shares may be
redeemed, then reissued, thus affording the majority a tool for eliminating any unwanted shareholders. Reorganizations will be subjected to a
"dilution test" to determine if dissenter's rights are to be granted, but
more structural changes are encompassed by the statute. Thus, once
the threshold requirement of sufficient dilution is surpassed, shareholders are given greater opportunity in which to exercise their dissenter's
281. However, there is a possible argument that the broader indemnification provisions may attract more competent managers.
282. See text accompanying notes 22-52 supra.
283. See text accompanying notes 53-63 supra.
284. See text accompanying notes 64-125 supra.
285. See text accompanying notes 126-61 supra.
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rights. Shareholders in large exchange-listed corporations, however,
may lose their dissenter's rights altogether.
4. Stock Issuance and Preemptive Rights28 q--The New Code does not
change the shareholder's status relative to stock issuance. The minority's relative corporate holdings could be significantly depleted by a stock
issuance, but article or bylaw protections could alleviate -this potential
problem.
5. Voting2 8 -- The cumulative vote is retained and offers an effective
tool to the minority shareholders seeking representation on the board of
directors. The number of votes required to effect shareholder decisions
has, in most cases, been set at a simple majority by the New Code. This
reduction from the present two-thirds vote is perhaps the most significant change affecting the minority shareholder in that it not only
reduces his ability to impact upon corporate affairs, but also it implies a
legislative posture favoring majority rule of corporations.
6. Corporate Records and Reports 28s -Corporate records will be more
accessible to -the minority shareholder under the New Code. This may
somewhat offset the reduction of the two-thirds vote required to effect
shareholder decisions.
7. Meetings and Quorums 28 -Under the New Code, the shareholder
is offered an expanded opportunity to compel corporate meetings. This,
too, may help alleviate his lowered voting effectiveness. Quorum
requirements are appropriately set to ensure adequate shareholder representation, although in the case of a close corporation, there is the added
protection of a majority-quorum requirement.
8. Sale of Control 29 -California courts are protective of the minority
in the sale of control situation. Presumably this position will continue
despite the detectible policy shift toward the majority.
9. Involuntary Dissolution 291 -The New Code alters dissolution provisions in ways which will impact upon minority shareholders. A proposed dissolution based upon management deadlock will be subjected to
a shareholder vote prior to the dissolution. A basis presently available
for dissolution, i.e. for -the protection of the rights or interests of shareholders, will be limited to corporations having 35 or fewer shareholders.
This limitation is offset somewhat 'by the expansion of persons eligible
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
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See
See
See
See

text accompanying
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162-67 supra.
168-201 supra.
202-18 supra.
219-30 supra.
231-44 supra.
245-66 supra.
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to initiate dissolution to include anyone named in the articles or any
shareholders in a close corporation.
10. Shareholder Suits 29 2-- Security-for-expense minimums have been
doubled by the New Code (from $25,000 to $50,000). Moreover,
broadened indemnification provisons make it likely that management
will more vigorously oppose a shareholder suit. Both of these changes
could significantly deter the minority shareholder seeking to assert his
interests through the judicial process.
CONCLUSION

Possibly the greatest potential for protecting the minority shareholders lies in the corporate articles and bylaws. Throughout this comment,
suggestions have been offered for protective corporate drafting. However, the likelihood of actually seeing protective-to-minority provisions
written into the articles or bylaws is probably minimal. One authority
states: "Managements want freedom from bothersome stockholders,
government agencies, public opinion, and judicial review. This is also
what most of the corporate bar would prefer .. ."29s In light of such
an attitude, it would be unrealistic for the minority shareholders to
expect favorable drafting absent considerable pressure on their behalf.
It is more likely that the minority shareholder will have to rely upon
the provisions of the California Corporations Code and upon the courts
to protect his interests. To the extent that California statutory law may
be moving away from shareholder protections and toward corporate
management, especially with respect to the concept of majority rule, the
California courts may well infer a mandate that current public policy is
to give greater consideration to the majority's position-even at the
expense of minority shareholders.
Ann H. Morris

292. See text accompanying notes 267-281 supra.
293. Cary, supra note 18, at 699.

